Transportation Executive Summary: Eighth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Driver’s Claim for Failure to Show He Was a Qualified Individual With a Disability
Core Issue
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit decided whether a truck driver with Parkinson's disease could pursue claims of disability discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation, and wrongful termination against his former employer under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and South Dakota state law, where his own sworn statements to the Social Security Administration undermined his ability to show he was a "qualified individual" capable of performing the essential functions of his job.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Jason Schmit (“Schmit”) was employed as a truck driver for Trimac Transportation, Inc. (“Trimac”) out of its Rapid City, South Dakota terminal from May 2017 to August 2021.1 In December of 2018, Schmit was diagnosed with Parkinson's disease.2 Following his diagnosis, “Trimac informally accommodated Schmit by assigning him to haul rock and coal” (avoiding ladder climbing, hose pulling, and making connections), having his trailer washed out by a third-party vendor after each trip, limiting him to a five-day workweek ending each day by 1:00 p.m., and allowing him to “haul light” (meaning loads of 117,000 pounds or less) to effectively shorten his trips when he was not feeling well.3
In March 2021, a new terminal manager, Gene Williams, was hired.4 Williams contacted HR about Schmit's disability and the limited work he could perform, prompting Trimac to formalize Schmit's accommodations in writing.5 Tensions escalated through the summer: Schmit was disciplined for running a stop sign and for hauling heavy on Wyoming interstates (a violation shared by a non-disabled driver who received the same written warning), and HR investigated his harassment complaints but found them unsubstantiated.6 Toward the end of the summer, “Williams told Schmit he needed to do things ‘his way’ or he would get rid of him ‘one way or another.’”7 Disability Rights South Dakota then submitted a letter on Schmit's behalf requesting two additional accommodations: that others perform tasks requiring getting up and down from the ground (including pre- and post-trip inspections) and that Schmit be assigned exclusively light loads.8 Trimac denied both requests, explaining that DOT regulations make drivers solely responsible for pre- and post-trip inspections and that exclusively light-load assignments would constitute an undue hardship affecting revenue, customers, and equitable dispatch distribution.9
On August 7, 2021, Schmit removed his belongings from his truck and told a coworker he “was done” and “not going to put up with it anymore.”10 He did not show up to work on August 9.11 Trimac emailed him on August 10 “purporting to ‘accept his resignation.’”12 Schmit denied resigning, and his attorney notified Trimac on August 13 that he was claiming wrongful termination.13
On August 18, the same day his treating physician noted he could work with unspecified accommodations, Schmit applied for total Social Security disability benefits, swearing under penalty of perjury that he became unable to work on August 7, 2021 “because of [his] disabling condition,” that it was “impossible” for him to work due to his inability to control his right hand, arm, leg, and foot, and that he suffered from hallucinations and delusions due to his Parkinson's medication.14 The Social Security Administration approved his application.15 Schmit then brought his claims against Trimac under the ADA and South Dakota state law.16 The District Court of South Dakota dismissed his state law discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment claims for failure to exhaust state administrative remedies, then granted Trimac's motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims, “largely because of Schmit's inconsistent representations about his disability” to the SSA.”17 Schmit appealed to the Eighth Circuit.18
DISCUSSION & HOLDINGS
Disability Discrimination
To establish a prima facie ADA discrimination claim, a plaintiff must show he is disabled, is a “qualified individual” able to perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation, and suffered an adverse employment action because of his disability.19 The Eighth Circuit assumed without deciding that Schmit was fired (an adverse action) but held that he failed to show he was a “qualified individual.”20
The court acknowledged that SSA disability findings do not automatically bar ADA claims because the SSA does not account for reasonable accommodations in its analysis.21 However, a plaintiff must provide a “sufficient explanation” for any “apparent contradiction” between their SSA statements and their present litigation position.22 The court found Schmit's explanations inadequate. 23 He did not merely claim he was “unable to work,” “[h]e swore under penalty of perjury that…it was ‘impossible’ for him to work because he couldn’t control [his] right hand, arm, leg [and] foot,” and that he suffered from hallucinations and delusions.24 Schmit’s treating physician's concurrent belief that he could work with unspecified accommodations led the court to question how “Schmit could make [those] factual representations in good faith and perform the essential functions of his job.”25 Schmit's alternative argument, that his disability only worsened after termination, also failed because his SSA representations “established that he was disabled on August 7,” before Trimac's email on August 10 purporting to accept his resignation.26
Hostile Work Environment
The court found that the discrete incidents Schmit identified: Williams referencing the “limited” work he could do, Williams's threat to get rid of him, and an asserted but uncorroborated pattern of “berating” — did not rise to the level of severe or pervasive harassment.27 Sporadic use of abusive language and the “ordinary tribulations of the workplace,” including smirking, unwanted after-hours calls, and discipline for policy violations, do not constitute “an actionable hostile work environment” under the ADA.28
Retaliation
A prima facie retaliation claim requires a causal connection between a protected activity and an adverse employment action.29 The court rejected Schmit's timing-based arguments.30 Williams's appointment as terminal manager was not a protected activity, and the several-month gap between Schmit's April accommodation request and his August termination was, standing alone, insufficient to establish the requisite causal link, particularly given Eighth Circuit precedent requiring temporal proximity to be “very close.”31
Wrongful Termination (South Dakota State Law)
The court affirmed dismissal of Schmit's state law wrongful termination claim because he failed to identify a “clear mandate of public policy” supporting it.32 Critically, the South Dakota Supreme Court in Matta v. Dakota Provisions expressly declined to recognize a public policy exception for disability-based discharge, reasoning that the legislature had already created robust statutory remedies for such claims under South Dakota law.33
CONCLUSION
The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in Trimac's favor on all claims.34 The decision is a significant reminder that sworn representations made to secure Social Security disability benefits — particularly those describing total incapacity — can be fatal to a subsequent ADA claim if the plaintiff cannot sufficiently explain the apparent contradiction. Employers in the transportation industry should take note that contemporaneous documentation of accommodation decisions, disciplinary actions, and policy compliance will be critical to defending these types of mixed-motive claims.
For More Information
Contact John F. Fatino for more information at 515-288-6041. Abigail M. Goulding assisted in the preparation of these materials.
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1 Schmit v. Trimac Transportation, Inc., 172 F. 4th 612, 615 (8th Cir. 2026).
2 Id.
3 Id. at 615–16.
4 Id. at 616.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 616–17.
8 Id. at 617.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 617–18.
17 Id. at 618.
18 Id.
19 Id. (citing Anderson v. KAR Glob., 78 F.4th 1031, 1036 (8th Cir. 2023).
20 Id. (citing Hill v. Walker, 737 F.3d 1209, 1219 (8th Cir. 2013) as authority that “[t]ermination, of course, is an adverse action.”).
21 Id. at 618–19 (quoting Cleveland v. Pol’y Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 803–05 (1999)).
22 Id. (quoting Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 806).
23 Id. at 619.
24 Id.
25 Id. (citing Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 807).
26 Id.
27 Id. at 620 (citing Wallin v. Minn. Dep’t of Corr., 153 F.3d 681, 688 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998 ) ) ) .
28 Id. (citing Wallin, 153 F.3d at 688 (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788)).
29 Id. (citing EEOC v. Prod. Fabricators, Inc., 763 F.3d 963, 972 (8th Cir. 2014)).
30 Id. at 620–21.
31 Id. at 621 (quoting Lors v. Dean, 746 F.3d 857, 865 (8th Cir. 2014)).
32 Id. (quoting Niesent v. Homestake Min. Co. of Cal., 505 N.W.2d 781, 783 (S.D. 1993)).
33 Id. (citing Matta v. Dakota Provisions, 15 N.W.2d 448, 457 (S.D. 2024)).
34 Id. at 615.
